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## JOAN OF ARC'S BATTLE AGAINST THE LOTHARINGIAN EMPIRE

For the Centennial celebration of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy's birth

by Pierre Beaudry, 5/29/17

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*“After having been given the general lieutenancy of the kingdom in October 1429, the Duke of Burgundy negotiated with Bedford throughout the winter in order to take possession of the regions of Champagne and Brie. These two provinces, which brought him to the gates of Paris, were granted to him by letters from King Henry, dated March 8, 1430. Thus, he concluded the union of all of his states by duly sealed contracts, and recreated a vast Empire ranging from the Sea to Savoy and from Alsace to the duchies of Bourbonnais, Berry, and Orleans - an immense Lotharingia. Decidedly, the English alliance had irresistible arguments. As for Charles VII, he had nothing left to give up except his crown.”*

Gabriel Hanotaux, JEANNE D'ARC, Hachette, 1911.





**Figure 1** Joan of Arc (1412-1431) Statuary from the Reims Cathedral

## INTRODUCTION

One of the most fascinating discoveries I had the pleasure of making while translating Gabriel Hanotaux's *Jeanne d'Arc*, (Edition Hachette, 1911) has been the constant revelations he made to the strategy of the Anglo-Burgundian policy; that is to say, the references to the alliances between the Duke of Burgundy and the "*Lotharingian Empire*" which the Duke Philip the Good was determined to reconstruct for his own benefit; however, an axiomatic intervention from Heaven thwarted the full realization of such an evil plan.

The following sections from Hanotaux's book are very important because they cast a completely different shadow from what is usually known of Joan of Arc's mission. They add a dimensionality never before reported about the history of her life that demonstrates the significance of her political role for the strategic vantage point of today. The point that Hanotaux makes clear is that the ultimate political and historical objective of her mission was to return to a policy of "love of mankind" such as was promoted under the functioning *filioque* policy-manifold of Charlemagne, which, in turn, sheds a definite light on Hanotaux's expectation of World War I.

As a former Foreign Affairs Minister of the French Government, Gabriel Hanotaux knew perfectly well that in the wake of the Sudanese Fashoda incident and its resulting 1904 *Alliance Cordiale* between France and the United Kingdom, the British were preparing France for a new war against Germany. This means that the 1911 publication of *JEANNE D'ARC* was a very timely event bringing the French people together in the spirit of Joan of Arc in an attempt to steer France away from war.

However, the French oligarchy did not see fit to welcome this book with great enthusiasm because of its previous commitment with England. The publication of this book was very untimely for the so-called "*Alliance Cordiale*." The British-French "friendship" could not afford to be troubled by an historian who was digging up the truth about the Lotharingian Empire out from under the feet of Perfidious Albion. The present report will tell you why.

## 1. HENRI PIRENNE AND THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF BURGUNDY

One of the most influential sources of truth in European history can be found in the exceptionally well-documented work of the nineteenth century historian, Henri Pirenne, *The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian State (Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries)*, The American Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (April., 1909,) pp. 477-502, Oxford University Press. The significance of the so-called “Lotharingian Empire” is made implicitly clear in the introductory note that Pirenne put on the identification of the “Burgundian State.” Pirenne wrote:

“But, to begin with, what is meant by the expression, Burgundian state? It is a modern term, and did not make its appearance before the end of the nineteenth century. It was invented to provide an exact designation for the political union in which, between the end of the fourteenth century and the middle of the sixteenth, the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands were joined under the authority of a single princely house.” (Henri Pirenne, *The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian State (Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries)*, The American Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (April., 1909,) p. 477.)

The explicit point that Pirenne makes is that the so-called “Burgundian State” did not, in fact, have any political reality to justify its existence: it was an unsuccessful attempt to take control over Western Europe as a whole by creating an imperial intention of perpetual war between France and Germany. During the Hundred Years War, and specifically during the time of Joan of Arc, the English took advantage of the fact that the three grandchildren of Charlemagne, Charles the Bald, Louis of Germany, and Lothar, had established a perfect geopolitical war-zone at the 843 Treaty of Verdun. Pirenne identified the strategic significance of such a boundary region. I quote the relevant two pages in their entirety:

“Like those states, it was the work of a princely house, and not of a monarchy, and, again like them, it consisted of an agglomeration of lands originally independent of one another. But while the other territorial states

were built up of districts subject to the same suzerainty, it united regions dependent on Germany (Brabant, Hainaut, Holland, Zeeland, Luxemburg, etc.) with regions dependent on France (Artois, Flanders). It included within its frontiers a fragment of each of the two great states between which it lay. Its princes, until the reign of Charles V, were at the same time vassals of the emperors and vassals of the Valois. In short, the Burgundian state appears to us as essentially a frontier state, or, to speak more exactly, as a state made up of the frontier provinces of two kingdoms. The Scheldt, the most important of its commercial routes, separated Francia Occidentalis from Francia Orientalis, from the time of the [Treaty of Verdun](#) (843).

“Of a hybrid nature even from this first point of view, the Burgundian state was still more so if we consider the peoples who dwelt in it. It was crossed not only by a political, but also by a linguistic frontier. Lacking unity of feudal dependence, it lacked, in a manner still more striking, national unity. It united a group of Romanic with a group of Germanic population. Walloons occupied all the southern portions - Namur, Hainaut, Artois, Gallic Flanders and southern Brabant; while people of Netherland speech, of Frankish or Frisian origin, dwelt in the Northern provinces. A frontier state between two kingdoms, it was still more a frontier state between two tongues. By a singular coincidence, it constituted at the same time the point of contact between the two great states of Western Europe, France and Germany, and the two great peoples that have formed European civilization, the Germanic and the Romanic.

“Finally, in addition to these two peculiarities we must mention a third. For the Burgundian state had no more geographic than it had political or linguistic unity. Except in the southeast, where it was protected by the hills of the Ardennes, it was open on all sides. Outlined on the great plain of northern Europe, it presented no natural obstacles, either on the side of Germany or on that of France. Of the three rivers which crossed it, the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt, not one has its source on Burgundian soil.

“Thus, from whatever side it is regarded, this state at first sight appears to have been the work of arbitrary will, and of chance. It seems nothing more than a confused assemblage of heterogeneous territories and of people still more heterogeneous; a sort of defiance that grasping and ambitious princes, favored by circumstances, hurled in the face of nature and of history. And in fact, in the fifteenth century, Charles VII and Louis XI in France, and the Emperor Sigismund in Germany, regarded it as something illegal and monstrous, the hateful result of an abominable usurpation. In our days a large number of historians have passed a similar judgment upon it. The French are unanimous in considering it a work of usurpation and violence accomplished by traitorous princes who endeavored to ruin the house of Valois from which they sprang by raising against it a rival power. In the Netherlands themselves, there is no lack of writers who, taking into account solely the resistance raised by provincial particularism against the dukes of Burgundy, see in the latter nothing more than grasping and brutal tyrants, trampling underfoot the national liberties, and owing their success to violence alone.” (*Ibidem.* p. 479-480.)

Such a partitioning of Europe is what the British Empire has been drooling over for centuries and has been constantly attempting to control ever since the end of Charlemagne’s True Commonwealth. Here is the perfect geopolitical set-up for creating an artificial construct such as the European Union of today. This is the map that the British Empire, under Edward VII and George V, used to set-up the two major conflicts of the twentieth century, World War I and World War II, and this is what the British Queen is presently basing her attempt to ignite World War III.

Such a hybrid situation of Lotharingia goes a long way into explaining why the populations of these countries suffered throughout the last millennium under such an artificial division. The point here is not to underestimate that fact, but to recognize that all means of a unified Europe today must account for the fact that their very existence is, as per its origins and not its character, the continuation of a historical fraud. Pirenne recognized that fact when he spoke about the beginnings of the independence of the Netherlands. Pirenne wrote:

“In the second half of the fourteenth century Count Louis de Male (1346-1384) from the house of Dampierre, dared openly to brave the King of France; he refused to do him homage for his fief, and united his policy closely to that of England. Thus, at the same epoch and in spite of the difference in the causes that produced this result, both of the constituent parts of the Netherlands, Flanders and Lotharingia, won, if not a legal, at least an actual separation from the two states of which they formed (France and Germany ed.), in the one case the extreme western point, in the other the extreme northern. In reality, thanks to the fluctuation of European politics, whose changing currents dashed themselves against this frontier land, they became, so to speak, *res nullius*.” (*Ibidem*. p. 484.)

Thus, the ignominious imperial practice of defining people by what they lack, as neither this nor that. This is what the imperial destiny of all of the peoples of Europe has been made to become during the last millennium, not by any fault or choice of their own, but by the pure circumstances of the effects of the pendulum swing of the changing imperial whims of those two states hitting against each other; that is, “*something of no significance*”, because they are defined as something that is neither French nor German, neither Romantic nor Germanic. And, it is that racial-cultural division which still rules Europe today. This is what Joan of Arc had come to change in order to give Europeans a chance to become human beings rather than pawns in an imperial game of chess.

Henri Pirenne, however, did not wish to go that far and finally decided to underplay the racial division of Europe that the British Empire would later be focused on, and take advantage of, during the twentieth century. He might not have foreseen the calamity of what the British were about to unleash on the world with two World Wars as a result of Lotharingian geopolitics. However, he did recognize that although the Treaty of Arras of 1435, which had given Philip the Good the right not “to pay homage to the emperor for his Lotharingian lands,” became a permanent dagger in the heart of Europe by the fact that it had “rendered perpetual under Charles V, through the Treaties of Madrid and Cambrai, the concession granted by Charles VII to Philip the Good.” In spite of that, Pirenne chose to underplay the measure and concluded in a footnote on this question:

“At the Congress of Berlin a discussion arose as to how far the remembrance of the kingdom of Lothar contributed toward the formation of the Burgundian state. It is incontestable, to my mind, that although this should not be given an exaggerated importance, the former existence of a kingdom between France and Germany aided to a certain extent the projects of the dukes of Burgundy.” (Ibidem, p. 494.)


## 2. THE TREATY OF VERDUN, JOAN OF ARC, AND BURGUNDY

*“Consequently, history hesitated for a long time. Besides, precautions had been taken. Everything was cloudy and hidden; those who had maneuvered the intrigue had carefully erased their footprints. It takes centuries for the truth to come out when you want to account for the affairs that touch the souls of nations.”*

Gabriel Hanotaux, *JEANNE D'ARC*, p. 161.

What Gabriel Hanotaux's *JEANNE D'ARC* reveals to the reader looking for truth in history is that Joan of Arc was consciously attempting to stop the war monstrosity that Europe had become since the founding of the Lotharingian Empire, at the [Treaty of Verdun](#) in 843.

In short, the [Treaty of Verdun](#) ended a three year long civil war among the three grandsons of Charlemagne, Louis the German, Charles the Bald, and Emperor Lothar. The family feud that set Europe ablaze was made explicit by the signing of the 842 [Oath of Strasbourg](#) which united the two younger brothers, Louis and Charles, against their elder brother Lothar. As a result of Lothar losing the war, the Charlemagne Commonwealth was partitioned into three parts.



**Figure 2** Map of the [Treaty of Verdun](#), 843.

1. A central portion given to Emperor Lothar, called the Lotharingian Empire, which included the Low Countries, Luxemburg, Alsace, Lorraine, the Duchy of Burgundy, Provence, and the Lombardy part the Italian peninsula.
2. An eastern portion given to Louis the German which included all of the lands to the East of the Rhine River and to the Northeastern part of Italy called East Francia.

3. A western portion given to Charles the Bald which included all of the lands west of the Lotharingian Empire, most notably the kingdom of Aquitaine and the lands west of the Rhone River, which were known as West Francia.

From the vantage point of Universal History, this artificial partitioning represents the creation of a Europe based on geopolitical warfare; that is, the source of most of the wars in European history to this day.

I am not implying that Joan of Arc knew the history of Lotharingia; what she knew was the disastrous effects of that historical concoction and her historical mission was to return to the spirit of Charlemagne. Hanotaux provides us with a map of what those results were in the form of the rapprochement which took place between Burgundy and the English. This is what Hanotaux says about the Anglo-Burgundian alliance:

“The affair starts with a pact signed in Amiens on April 17, 1423 where a rapprochement took place among the Duke of Burgundy, the Duke of Bedford, the Duke of Bretagne, the Comte of Foix and Richemont. Queen Yolande and the Duke of Savoy were brought into the secret of this arrangement through the Duke of Burgundy. That was a formidable alliance. These powerful allies had come together because they were hoping to get a parcel of what remained of the power and the substance of the kingdom of France.

“France is at its lowest ebb. The battle of Verneuil (August 17, 1424) has reduced the kingdom unconditionally. The Dauphin Charles is despairing; he was begging for peace on his knees. Queen Yolande advises him to speak with the Duke of Bretagne, whose relationships with Burgundy and with England can help him obtain some benefits of appeasement from the victorious party. Richemont volunteers to be the negotiator. Resolved to avoid the worst peril, Charles VII abandons his government and his own person to the rich and powerful: it is salvation by renouncing and conceding.

“Richemont agrees under the conditions set by the Duke of Burgundy. He went to stay with his brother-in-law for a month before making a

decision. The agreement of Montluel among Savoy, Bretagne, and Richemont, with the cooperation of the Duke of Burgundy, established the conditions that Charles accepted. When Richemont received the sword of the Constable, on March 7, 1425, before the assembly of the General-Estates, assembled at Tours, there was a general acknowledgement that it was an “abdication” of Charles VII, and “that the King had given into their enactment.”

“Richemont seizes power. Without striking a blow, he drives out all of the old counselors of the Dauphin, eliminates the bloody and depraved Armagnacs, kicks out President Louvet, Tanneguy-Duchatel, and the surgeon Cadart, including ‘people of low and small standing, whose purpose was to take control over the goods of the kingdom.’ Richemont displays his program as clearly as possible by stating: ‘Confirm, conclude and *appoint everywhere the fact of the peace*, advise together in order to provide for what is necessary for the restoration of the kingdom, and for the *union of the lords in the bloodline of this nobleman*, impose justice and eliminate all pillaging and stealing.’”

“The complete capitulation of the royal family was settled at the meeting of Saumur, between Charles VII and Jean VI Duke of Bretagne (October 1425), a meeting which was the knot of this extraordinary combination. ‘The King told him and declared, as to his closest relative, that *he wanted*, from that moment on, for his personal affairs and for the affairs of the kingdom, to be governed by him and in accordance with his council.’”

“The Duke of Bretagne declared to the King that he has no other directive to give but the following: ‘1. do your duty: *rally and reduce under my command your entire blood-family*; 2. *Primarily the Duke of Burgundy*; 3. In order to make appropriate offers to the Duke of Burgundy, take as bonds the articles written by the Duke of Savoy in December 1424, and refer to me, Duke of Bretagne, and to the intermediary of the Duke of Savoy; 4. In order to fulfill your duty to God and your own conscience, *make reasonable offers to the English*, and consult the Duke of Bretagne on this subject, and

give to the said Duke the financial authority over the finances of the region of the Languedoc...etc.” (That is to say, the last region which is still paying regular subsidies to the royalty.)<sup>1</sup>

“The oaths were exchanged. Richemont reigned. The policy of the aristocracy was triumphant.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Jeanne d'Arc*, Hachette, Paris, 1911, p. 176-78.)

The purpose of the 1424 battle of Verneuil in Normandy, which ended with a complete English victory and a glorification of the Comte de Bedford, was to bring the totality of France under the rule of England. The battle itself was very bloody and was considered a second battle of Agincourt (1415). A total of 7,262 French and 4,000 allied Scots were killed. The English suffered only 1,600 losses. After that British victory, the Normandy part of France came under English rule, including Maine and Anjou. Only Mount Saint-Michel resisted due to the courage of the Monks.

Since the 1420 Treaty of Troyes had completely disinherited the king of France, the Dauphin Charles VII only had the south-eastern part of France left to rule over. The southwestern part of France, Aquitaine, was also ruled by the English. Following a series of accommodating assassinations between the families of the Duke of Orleans and the Duke of Burgundy, a civil war broke out between the Armagnacs, allies of Charles d'Orleans and the Burgundians.


On the side of the Dauphin, a large contingent of Scottish forces, about 6,000, came to help in 1419, led by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Buchan, John Stewart. The Army of Scotland joined the French Army against the English and was victorious at the Battle of Baugé, on March 22, 1421 near Angers, but the Scottish support collapsed after the defeat of Verneuil. The Scots had been the allies of the French since 1295.

The elevation of the Duke of Bedford to the hero of Verneuil was a major challenge for Joan of Arc, because it was this John of Lancaster, First Duke of

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<sup>1</sup> Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII, Le roi de Bourges, 1422-1435*, Librairie de la Société bibliographique, Tome II, 1882, p. 113.

Bedford, who tried and executed Joan at Rouen. But, paradoxically, he was also responsible for the defeat of the English Army, because his obstinate lie that Joan was a witch is what sent the English soldiers back to England, completely mad with terror.



**Figure 3** Maps of France during the Hundred Years War of English occupation and during the German occupation of World War II.

### 3. THE POLITICS OF THE CEASEFIRES

There is a series of ironies in connection with the multiple ceasefires proposed by the Duke of Burgundy during the two years of Joan of Arc's campaign which all show the duplicity of the Burgundian. I bring to the attention of the reader the fact that if one wants to understand the real history of Europe, it is necessary to understand the diplomacy of peace treaties, because their diplomatic language always hides the fallacy of composition of their duplicitous intentions. Take the Treaty of Amiens, for example.

The 1423 Treaty of Amiens is generally interpreted as a mutual defense pact among the Duke of Bedford, the Duke of Burgundy, and the Duke of Bretagne consolidating the British-Burgundian alliance against France up until 1435. In fact, the terms of the Treaty were announced to the people as marriages of convenience between the Duke of Bedford and the daughter of Philip the Good's younger sister, Anne of Burgundy, and between the Earl of Richmond and Margaret of Burgundy, the elder sister of Philip the Good. The real purpose of the treaty, which was not publicized, was that the three Dukes had agreed to acknowledge Henry VI of England as the true King of France. In other words, the fallacy of composition was the announcement of two weddings, and the underlying assumption was for "the good of our lord the king of the kingdom of France and England." This meant that all three rejected the authority of the King of France, Charles VI, but no such thing was ever pronounced in the formal language of the text and the people knew nothing of it.

The Treaty of Amiens is a typical example of the fraudulent diplomacy of European affairs more generally: you do something and you mean something else. If one were to follow the language of all of the ceasefire proposals during this period, one could risk drowning in a sea of similar fallacies of composition. I will spare you that torturous boarding experience and simply give you what Hanotaux had to say about it:

"On the side of France, Philip the Good held out the hook by a series of armistice and ceasefire proposals, constantly renewed and extended, under the promise of an approaching rapprochement and a general pacification. In reality, these conventions were always very poorly observed, and always in favor of the ambiguities which subsist on their true bearing. They do not prevent the Duke of Burgundy from coming to the assistance of the English, supplying them with subsidies, men-at-arms, and from authorizing his generals to serve under the King of England.

"If one were to take into account all of these indefinitely repeated combinations, it is an entire diplomatic history of the reign of Charles VI which should be written. All considered, these combinations actually mark

the stepping stones of the political process which will prevail after the death of Joan of Arc; that is, the Arras Treaty.<sup>2</sup>

“In 1423, in Bourg-en-Bresse, under the auspices of the Duke of Savoy, official go-between of these transactions, there is a first ceasefire, a first drawing up of a “general peace” negotiated by the Duke of Bretagne at Nantes in September 1424; a new ceasefire signed by the Duke of Savoy in Chambery, from October 5, 1424 to May 1, 1425; negotiations of Macon in December 1424; Montruel in January 1425, which decided the bringing of Richemont into the affairs. This is the time when the Duke of Burgundy is propitiating the French to the highest degree in the hopes of a future reconciliation. His entanglements with the Duke of Gloucester over the wedding of Jacqueline de Baviere are turning sour, and there is even a rumor to the effect that the leaders of the English policy are preparing his assassination.

“The Duke of Richemont took the bait. By grabbing power, he let the Duke of Burgundy know that as long as he was to have some authority in the Court of the Dauphin, ‘everything that had been concluded between them (that is to say the Amiens Pact) had to be considered as concluded.’ He repeats to the same Duke that ‘nothing should stop them from working together, in concert, for the good of the kingdom and for the restoration of the houses they are from.’<sup>3</sup>”

“During the last months of 1425, and the beginning of 1426, the policy of negotiations and of meaningless ceasefires continues unabated. But, Philip, increasing his double-play, decides to have a rapprochement with the Duke of Bedford. Soon, he becomes the winner in Holland, at Browershaven, against the supporters of Jacqueline de Baviere, and that success does not diminish in any small measure his arrogance.

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<sup>2</sup> The documentation for this part of the history of Charles VII have been gathered by M. de Beaucourt in his *Histoire de Charles VII, Le roi de Bourges, 1422-1435*, Tome II, p. 325-360.

<sup>3</sup> See the documentation published in Dom Planchet, *Histoire de Bourgogne*, Tome IV, p. LVI. The whole scheme and purpose underlying the policy of the “Peace of Burgundy” can be found there.

“Richemont becomes desperate. In May 1427, he attempts a supreme effort. The whole country is clamoring for peace and everything depends on Philip the Good! Some go as far as offering him the governance of the kingdom. Ultimately, that’s what he wants, but will he accept the offer from Charles or from Henry, from France or from England? He hesitates and makes a sudden move toward Bedford.

“In the midst of the general breakdown, the lords of the two parties make deals for their own personal benefits. In July 1427, the Bastard of Orleans (Dunois) in the name of his imprisoned brother agrees to a ceasefire with the English, signed by Suffolk and Bedford, securing the domains of the Duke and, notably, the city of Orleans. It is after that ceasefire fails that the siege of the city will take place a few months later.

“Everything was allurement, deceit, and lies. Wars of ambush were based on politics of ambush. On both sides, everybody is short of money, of men, and of conviction; but, it is the French party which is at the lowest ebb of all. After having thrown himself at the feet of his enemies, the heir of the crown has achieved nothing. The siege of Orleans is going to decide the fate of the provinces south of the Loire River. If only a last resort negotiation could succeed!

“Duke Philip was not very interested in allowing the English settle permanently along the Loire Valley and thus unite the domains of Guyenne and of Gascony with Normandy and the Ile de France. Accepting Henry VI as master of Orleans meant the creation of an English France. The Duke of Burgundy was as hostile to such an outcome as he was to a victory of Charles VII. This was understood among his entourage and this is what kept the smart ones of the Court in expectation, in case of a rapprochement.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Jeanne d'Arc*, Hachette, Paris, 1911, p. 182-84.)

The irony, here, is that all of these ceasefires were the prelude to war-like aggressions.

#### 4. THE BREAKING OF THE BURGUNDY AND BEDFORD ALLIANCE: WHO IS GOING TO GET “THE CHICKS?”

Did you ever ask yourself why Philip the Good was called the “Good”? It was because he was such a “good swindler.” He gave France to the King of England at the Treaty of Troyes by getting the mad King Charles VI to sign on the dotted line. Such an action was considered binding in those days. That is the highest claim to fame of the Duke before he got Joan of Arc burned at the stake. How much more “Good” than that can you get?

Being of the cadet line of the Valois family, Philip was a key player in the French royal family, and Bedford never forgot that fact of French life. The Burgundian was a prominent figure of the Valois dynasty. Also, as the ruler of Artois, Brabant, Flanders, Friesland, Hainaut, Holland, Namur, and Zeeland, the Duke of Burgundy played a central role in the history of the Low Countries.<sup>4</sup> The portrait that the Renaissance artist, Roger van der Weyden, made of him is very telling, and Hanotaux has an excellent depiction of it in his *Jeanne d'Arc*. (See **Figure 4**)

What broke the relationship between the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Bedford was nothing short of a classical failure of untying the Gordian knot. The trap was known as “*The Peace of Burgundy*.” The truth of the matter is that this is how the duke of Burgundy lost the war by making believe he was winning the peace. For the first time in history, Hanotaux dared to report that situation as it was kept secret before:

“After the battle of the Herrings, the besieged, having certainly reached an agreement with the Court, sent an embassy to the Duke of Burgundy to implore his intervention, and to offer him to *put the city and the*

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<sup>4</sup> See Henri Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*; and Henri Pirenne, *The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian State (Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries)*, The American Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (April., 1909,)

*duchy of Orleans under his protection.* This takes place at the end of February, beginning of March 1429.

“The Duke of Burgundy understood the benefit he could gain by accepting such an opening. He went to Paris to meet with the Duke of Bedford and he proposed to him that he become the arbiter of the debate and the guarantor of the duchy of Orleans. Thus, he would have kept the destiny of the kingdom in suspense and manipulated the fate of the kingdom to his benefit. The Regent of England did not go that far. He rejected the proposal very loudly, saying “*that he would be very sorry to have beaten the bushes so that others could have the chicks.*” (Emphasis added)

“The exchange was quite rough. Bedford reprimanded the Duke of Burgundy for his use of fine words, “seeking rather the good of the Dauphin than that of the King of England and of his own.” Getting upset in turn, or pretending to be, Philip supposedly told the Embassy how things happened: ‘And, with encouraging words for Charles VII, he reportedly concluded that the Dauphin, with his entire party, would be very miserable if he did not succeed in gaining some strength, and that the Dauphin could be made to understand that he, the Duke of Burgundy, would not meddle in anything.’

“Indeed, Philip the Good dispatched the order to his troops, by sending a herald who arrived at Orleans with the embassy, telling the men to leave the camp of the English, which they did at once, and as a result of which: ‘the English power was greatly weakened.’

“The situation was improving in the entourage of Charles VII, especially within his two main parties, but to the exclusion of the old Armagnacs who were told to leave. People regained their confidence and were reconfirmed in their policy of ‘The Peace of Burgundy.’ They believed what they wished to hear that ‘The Peace of Burgundy,’ which is the general wish, was the solution and, above all, - according to the point of view of the parties, - the power at stake!

“Here is how the parties were engaged and linked at the moment when Joan of Arc arrived at Chinon:

“The English put all of their forces on the Loire in order to break the last link of French unity. If that link breaks, the enemy will be the masters, from Rouen to Bordeaux, from one sea to the other.

“The Duke of Burgundy cunningly engaged in his double maneuvering, which, while containing England, tended to substitute Flemish Burgundy for Latin France.

“At the court of Charles VII all of the parties, except for the compromised Armagnacs and the faithful of the impotent Charles VII, discussed the pros and cons of “The Peace of Burgundy,” that is, peace at all costs, peace through humility and dismemberment. Of these parties, the most dangerous, because it represents a force and a system, is the apanage aristocracy led by Richemont, allied with the Duke of Burgundy.

“The situations are so distorted by the length of the wars and by the incoherence of the diplomacy, that everyone can only follow his instinct and interest blindly. France is forgotten.

“France is agonizing ..., unless all these obscure causes, these false violences, these shady compromises, and these troubled waters are purged and clarified; that is, unless a clear mind, a firm will, an ardent heart intervenes, directs and purifies: Joan of Arc appears.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Jeanne d'Arc*, Hachette, Paris, 1911, p. 184-86.)



**Figure 4** Rogier van der Weyden, *Portrait of Philip III the Good* (1396-1467)

## 5. THE TWO MEMORANDA OF THE ANGLO-BURGUNDIAN ALLIANCE

The Anglo-Burgundian alliance was sealed at the Treaty of Troyes, in 1420; in continuation with the Anglo-Norman alliance of Henry II Plantagenet (1154-1189), which had initiated more than a hundred years of conflicts between France and England. That policy was itself grounded on the Anglo-Norman collaboration with the English under the dynasty of William the Conqueror (1028-1087). The best way to understand the ins and outs of these Anglo-Burgundian alliances can be found in the amazing report written by the Captain of Compiègne, Guillaume de Flavy. Hanotaux reported the matter in the following two pages:

“But, more stable guarantees are necessary, still: the actual conquest. That’s what the most authoritative minister of Philip the Good is negotiating in England. While peace is being promised to the deplorable entourage of Charles VII, Hugues de Lannoy is concocting a completely new combined plan of attack between England and Burgundy against the same Charles VII. He wrote two memoranda, which have been luckily conserved and which reveal the fundamental elements of that sophisticated policy.

“One of those two memoranda was mostly aimed at establishing a concerted military action between the two allies and the other one dealt with their intervention in the affairs of the kingdom of France. As for war, they must fight it together; but, as for the spoils, Burgundy was the one intending to dispose of them.

“Hugues de Lannoy had proclaimed the necessity of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance. As he said: ‘It appears from considering the fact that the Duke of Burgundy is aware of the nastiness and malevolence that his enemies have had and still have toward him (the day after the ceasefire of August 28!), and which is still at work against him every day: consequently it is essential that he should have good alliances with the *English...*’ This said, after the usual rhetorical posturing about peace, he added that it is war that he must prepare for, and rather sooner than later, that is to say before Christmas, which is the limit date of the ceasefire.

“The King of England is himself expected to cross over to the continent ‘in full royal regalia and power’ with the intention of getting himself also crowned in Reims. It is therefore required that the Duke help subsidize and finance a well-ordered mobilization with powerful Burgundian armies for this purpose. He is going to send over to him the cardinal of Winchester in order to organize with the Duke of Burgundy all that is necessary for that common action. Embassies will be sent throughout the countries of Europe in order to get material and moral contributions which will hem in the adversary. A general program of armament and of necessary subsidies will be established.

“But, when the question arises as to how to dispose of the eventual outcome of the victory, the French lords go back to their old habits and stick to their old agreements. They get back to the Burgundy-Bretagne-Richemont agreement; that is to say, to the consortium of the apanage families, the only combination of forces which offers all of the benefits, with the minimum amount of risks, to the natural leader of these houses which have been insurgent against the elder branch, the Duke of Burgundy.

“The princes of the royal family are submitted to the same temptations and the same reversal of the situation is expected of them. First negotiate with the Duke of Bretagne and offer him the Poitou. Then, negotiate with Richemont, and offer him, in addition to the title of constable in the name of Henry IV, the Duchy of Touraine, the Comte of Saintonge et d’Aulnis, and the town of La Rochelle, plus all of the possessions and lordships of Sir de La Trémoïlle.

“In a word, it is the dismemberment and the disintegration of the kingdom which is being framed under the ceasefires of August 28. We see that Joan of Arc had a clear vision of things when she refused to negotiate.

“This program adopted in London, point by point, directed the action of the two united powers during the intermediary period that led to the capture of Joan of Arc.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Jeanne d’Arc*, Hachette, Paris, 1911, p. 202-204.)

These alliances represent the highest point ever reached where France might be forced into becoming English. (These pages should be studied closely and further investigated by the Quebecois of Canada, especially the memorandum of September-December 1429 inspired by Hugues de Lannoy and reproduced by Pierre Champion, because they might go a long way into explaining the resistance movement of that province to the British Empire).

On September 30, 1429, the city council of Compiègne decided that “Compiègne did not want any other Prince but the King and refused to submit its will to no other captain than the one who had submitted his own will to his majesty.” (Pierre Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, Honore Champion Éditeur, Paris, 1906, p. 142-148.) The psychological device that Hugues de Lannoy used was based on the false underlying assumption whereby, since the French people want peace at all cost, they must be ready to give themselves to the English ruler in order to have it, because it doesn’t matter who rules them, as long as their families are secured. Of course, this is the oldest trick in the book which the people of Compiègne rejected in the spirit of Joan of Arc’s policy: “Peace can only be achieved *at the point of the lance*.”

Hanotaux made this same point that the enemies of France were so desperate that they even used the subterfuge of a false prophetess to lure the people of Compiègne into believing in “*The Peace of Burgundy*.” He wrote:

“Her thinking can be summarized in her rejection of a subterfuge that was devised in order to throw confusion in the royal camp a little bit after the retreat from the Loire Valley. An attempt was made to diminish the power of insight of Joan of Arc by introducing a false visionary by the name of Catherine de la Rochelle. Since it was not possible to hide the clear luminosity that Joan was able to shine all around herself, someone had attempted to diminish her power of insight by introducing this woman who claimed that father Richard wanted to ‘promote her action in order that she be sent to the Duke of Burgundy for the purpose of achieving the peace.’ (*Trial*, I, 107-119) Joan had no problem seeing through the fallacy of this intrigue and had this Catherine sent back “to her chores and to the care of

her children.” Joan’s entire thought can be summed up in her usual lively way of speaking. As she put it in clear opposition to what this liar had said: “We will not achieve peace *unless it is at the point of the lance.*”

“Here you have the two opposing philosophies confronting each other; nothing can be clearer. Charles VII had the choice between the false hope of an implored peace and the energetic risk of an imposed peace. He chose against Joan of Arc and his most judicious and brave advisors. Let me remind you that, Joan of Arc always acts in accordance with her own inspiration, her good sense, and her courage. Her political intuition, based on undeniable facts and documented evidence, is infinitely superior to anything that can be expected of a Lorraine “shepherdess.” Excellent “battle commander” at the head of the army, she is no less shrewd in the middle of the Court and before the Council.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Jeanne d’Arc*, Hachette, Paris, 1911, p. 214.)

The reason why Joan of Arc refused to negotiate the so-called “*Peace of Burgundy*” is because all of those negotiations were fakes. What was hidden in the negotiations of ceasefires and in the false hope of “*The Peace of Burgundy*” was the dismemberment of the kingdom, a further partitioning of the regions among oligarchical enemy contenders.

## 6. ANGLO-DUTCH TRADE COMPETITION

Both Hanotaux and Pirenne emphasize the fact that the English plan was always oriented toward taking over France for the benefit of their commercial empire. The thinking was: “Let the Burgundians keep the internal lands, we’ll take the coast-line.” The fact that the capturing of Orleans was a central part of that strategy is exemplary, because an English Orleans would have connected Normandy with Aquitaine and the entirety of the Atlantic coast of France would have become English. In addition, this is how Hanotaux referred to the Anglo-Dutch trade question:

“The drape makers and weavers were beginning to suffer from English competition; they required from their Duke the abandonment of a

ruinous alliance and the reopening of the inexhaustible markets which the French border regions usually represent for them.<sup>5</sup>

“After the capture of Joan of Arc, a terrible and confusing campaign was organized in Picardie, Burgundy, and Champagne, etc., which did not improve business and had ruined the country. The two allies hold each other responsible for the disaster. Philip did not forgive the English government for mishandling the affair of Jacqueline de Baviere, nor the snobbish attitude of Bedford on the question of the ‘chicks.’

“The Duke is also threatened from another side. The Burgundian “grandeur” has frightened Germany, and the Emperor, Sigismund, approached by the King of France, has pronounced himself. The Duke is going to be caught between a rock and a hard place. With a domain that is barely holding together, this is the danger that he fears the most. Ever since the affair of the ecclesiastic benefits had been settled with France, the Pope and the Council of Basel have been calling for peace. This is an authority which can no longer be despised.

“The simplest measure is to come to immediate realizations. Charles VII is reconciled with the Duke of Bretagne. Unceasingly, he proposes new openings to Burgundy and to England for the purpose of a general peace. Even England herself seems to understand that times have changed.

“On September 8, 1431, a truce of two years is signed at Chinon between Burgundy and France; then, on December 31, an arrangement between France and England is concluded, under the auspices of Papal legates, which will help toward the consolidation of a definite peace.<sup>6</sup>

“All of this takes place in the same year that Joan of Arc died. Such was the immediate and direct effect of her action and intervention when she made the decision of helping her good friends of Compiègne.” (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Jeanne d'Arc*, Hachette, Paris, 1911, p. 233.)

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<sup>5</sup> Henri Pirenne, [\*Histoire de la Belgique\*](#), Tome II, p. 243.

<sup>6</sup> Beaucourt, Op. Cit., II, p. 43.

This is where Philip the Good gets his hands into conquering new states, as far as the North Sea. It took him less than twenty years to reconstitute the Lotharingia under his authority. He bought the County of Namur in 1429, obtained the succession of Brabant and Limburg with the Magraviate of Antwerp at the death of cousin Philip of Saint-Pol in 1430, he forced the inheritance of Hainaut, Holland, Zeeland, at the death of Jacqueline of Bavaria in 1436, including West Friesland. The Duke then bought the Duchy of Luxemburg in 1443. In 1456, he managed to have his family elected at the bishoprics of Liege and Utrecht.

A century later, it was Charles V, ruler of the Spanish Empire and the Holy Roman Empire who completed the annexations of the ancient Lotharingian territories by wars. As Pirenne reported:

“But Charles V was to complete the annexations which constituted, after 1543, the union of the seventeen provinces. He won Tournay from France in 1521, acquired Friesland in 1523, Overyssel and Utrecht in 1528, Groningen in 1536, and finally Guelders in 1543. Henceforth the Burgundian state was complete, and would receive no further aggrandizement.” (Henri Pirenne, *Op. Cit*, p. 492.)

No one had been able to reconstitute the Lotharingian territory to that extent as Philip the Good and Charles V had. The reconstruction of Lotharingia even became an asset of the Hapsburg Holy Roman Empire up until the end of the twentieth century, when the founder of the PanEuropean Union, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi gave birth to the European Union in Maastricht on November 1, 1993. However, even that ultimate fraudulent form of Lotharingia was doomed to self-destruct, because the seventeen United Provinces are about to decide that each of its peoples become a win-win partner for the benefit of one another in a new World Land-bridge economic order.

## 7. THE END OF THE BRITISH-LOTHARINGIAN EMPIRE AND THE QUESTION OF WHERE TRUE LEGITIMACY LIES

Although the deconstruction of Europe, which originated with the 842 Oath of Strasbourg, may not appear to be such a corrosive geopolitical event of pitting

against each other three brothers of the same family, their allies, and their posterity for the purpose of keeping separate two apparently different cultures such as the Romantic and the Germanic cultures of Europe, and even though *such an Oath may not have been given an exaggerated importance* in the purview of Universal History, I challenge any living, or yet to be born historian, to find an equivalent example whose strategic and epistemological impact has affected more lives, in more diverse countries, and during a longer period of time, in the entire history of mankind.

To my knowledge, not even Pirenne and Hanotaux have considered the full strategic and epistemological significance of such a fraud committed upon the history of nations. No historian has ever seen the necessity to investigate the strategic and epistemological significance of the Lotharingia fraud. Why not? Maybe someone in Germany might have more courage than the French or Belgians to answer that question.

This is not the place for me here to debate the pros and cons of this momentous historical event any further, for I have already written sufficiently on this subject elsewhere, during the last few years, especially in my reports: **LOTHARINGIA: THE HISTORICAL TROJAN HORSE INSIDE OF EUROPE**; **JEANNE D'ARC AND THE BURGUNDIAN QUESTION**; **THE AXIOMATIC CHANGE OF JOAN OF ARC ACCORDING TO GABRIEL HANOTAUX**; and **JOAN OF ARC: THE FULFILLMENT OF THE PROMISE**.

If you consider that the mission of Joan of Arc was to bring back to mankind the true legitimacy of human sovereignty, then you cannot exclude the Oath of Strasbourg as having expressed the complete opposite intention. Although her short campaign of less than two years was essentially a military operation, the real victory of her historical intervention was a psychological and epistemological victory of the human mind over pettiness, greed, and lust for power. Some have called it an ideological victory of the French over the English, but that is not true. Joan of Arc demonstrated where true legitimacy of sovereignty lies by her sacrifice; that is, in solving the paradox of the *fulfillment of the promise*.

By bringing an end to the Hundred-Years War (1337-1453), the 1435 Treaty of Arras appeared to bring and end to warfare in Europe. That was a complete illusion. Nothing was further from the truth. It was simply a time-out period before another conflict erupted. Why? Because the treaty secured the option of future conflicts by giving recognition to the independence of Burgundy and to the oligarchical state of mind that had dominated Europe until that time. The new treaty merely reinforced the fact that Lotharingia represented an unstoppable pendulum bob motion of war between France and Germany; that is, a geopolitical view of the world based on taking advantage of the other.

The benefits of war, however, did not always sway toward the side of the Empire. For instance, after the grace period of the twelfth century, under the reign of the German Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa (1122-1190), it became the turn of the French, under Louis IX (1214-1270, known as Saint-Louis), to make a play for Lotharingia. Even Saint-Louis, who was one of the better French Kings, was caught in the geopolitical trap when he acted as arbitrator between the houses of Avesnes and of Gampierre during the thirteenth century; especially when, in 1246, he gave Flanders to the Dampierre family and Hainaut to the Avesnes family. Both of these Lotharingian territories were considered parts of the Empire.

As European history had been determined by the swing of the pendulum, the authority of Germany always decreased in proportion to an increase in the authority of France, and *vise versa*. And this went on, unceasingly, century after century. There was no way to put an end to this pendulum warfare of Europe until Joan of Arc came and acted to break the Anglo-Burgundian alliance of Empire. Her efforts finally succeeded when Louis XI defeated the Duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold, at the Battle of Nancy in January of 1477. As Hanotaux concluded near the end of Chapter III: the *abandonment*:

“Philip the Good knows that Richemont and the party of the rich and powerful offered him the most serious guarantees for the conclusion of an honorable and beneficial peace. He knows that the arrangements are such in France that he will be given the maximum of territorial concessions, and this, in his eyes, is the main point. The general reconciliation took place at

Nevers, amid banquets and drunkenness. The French princes were assembled around the royalty which had been restored to its proper place it is true, but after having paid dearly for the sacrifice of fealty and homage which they consented to the Duke. Such is the true meaning of the peace of Arras of 1435." (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Jeanne d'Arc*, Hachette, Paris, 1911, p. 234.)

Here, Hanotaux is being cautious by not revealing the fact that the Treaty of Arras was a complete cover up of the true source of the eternal conflict of the Lotharingian Empire, which had been embedded in the very nature of the faulty European form of diplomacy since 843. The failure, here, is the failure of not considering the geopolitical nature of the borderland policy of the Burgundian Empire that Henri Pirenne had identified above with the geographic constitution of Burgundy; that is, the axiomatic evil nature of Lotharingia.

The point to be made from the vantage point of Universal History is that Europe had been organized since 843 for the purpose of warfare. After Charlemagne, Europe was turned into a theater of war. It is the diplomatic axiom of such a Europe which is today breaking down with the collapsing of the European Union; that is, *the end of taking advantage of the other*. And, the reason is that the swing of the pendulum of war established during all of these years between Germany and France had the wrong curvature for Europe as a whole. The curvature was British geopolitics. The only change of curvature that might have saved Europe was the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. But that was sabotaged with the French Revolution in 1789. Today, the idea of a sovereign nation state of Europe has disappeared and has been replaced by the Lotharingian concoction of the European Union. How long can this last?

This is the reason, among others, why Hungary's Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, was right in saying that the "old model of globalization" of Europe is dead and the world is looking forward to the new development-based global paradigm that the Belt and Road Forum has created on May 14 and 15, 2017 in Beijing; notably based on completely new axioms reflected in the win-win approach of Xi Jinping.

The doctrine of hatred and warfare that Europe has been built on since the [Treaty of Verdun](#) of 843 is now coming to an end, as is the monstrosity that became the European doctrine of diplomacy for over a millennium. There is nothing to fear about this demise: This is a natural process of self-destruction. Hanotaux ends the chapter on Joan's *abandonment* by writing these prophetic words with respect to a new form of pendulum swing; which is, as Lyndon LaRouche would say, an isochronic catenary swing. As Hanotaux concluded about the career of Joan of Arc:

“Thus the rhythm of this fantastic career alternates: the *formation* was human, the *mission* was divine; the *abandonment* was human, the *condemnation* will be divine.

“For the lesson to be completed and for men to learn without understanding it, consider, one more time, how little the individual and the ephemeral count in the presence of the general and the definite. They had to weigh down on the divine in her so that the divine could supersede them and leave them dazzled, before she returned, under their eyes, to her eternal dwelling in a surge of joyful abnegation.” (*Ibidem*, p. 236.)

The point that Hanotaux is making is to rise above the stupidity of your own time: Elevate, elevate, always elevate!

